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  This study investigates the association between firm characteristics, corporate governance 
attributes and the level of corporate disclosure of listed firms in India. The research paper has 
been based on a sample of 60 firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) / National 
Stock Exchange (NSE) during the study period from 2000-01 to 2009-10. The study has used 
the Standard & Poor (2008) model for measuring the level of corporate disclosure. To examine 
the association between explanatory variables and the level of corporate disclosure, multiple 
regression model has been used. The results suggest a positive relationship between board size, 
ratio of audit committee members to total board members, family control, CEO duality, firm 
size, profitability, liquidity and the extent of corporate disclosure. However, the degree of 
corporate disclosure is negatively related to board composition, leverage and age of the firm.       
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, several scandals and scams concerning the activities of the business enterprises have 
occurred around the globe. Due to these corporate failures, the importance of corporate disclosure has 
been increasing day by day. Annual report is the most important medium of the reported transparency 
and corporate disclosure practices. But published annual reports do not fulfill the need of the 
interested parties because managers are likely to consider their own interests when exercising 
managerial decision. Less information disclosure in the annual reports creates information 
asymmetry.  
Higher level of corporate disclosure in the financial reports reduces the information asymmetry 
between companies and the investors, enhances the value of stock in the capital market and increases 
liquidity (Karim, 1996). In fact, lower level of corporate disclosure increases the difference between 
expected and actual disclosures. The levels of corporate disclosure vary from firm to firm, industry to 
industry and also from country to country. The decision to provide or not to provide certain  essential   46
information  is  likely to be  influenced by a  variety of factors  like  board  size, ratio of audit 
committee members to total board members, board composition, non-executive directors, 
independent  directors, family  control, CEO duality,  firm size,  profitability, leverage, liquidity,  
ownership  structure, assets-in-place and age of the firm. Hence, the present study is designed to find 
out their relations with the level of corporate disclosure. Earlier  research  studies examine various  
firm characteristics  and  their relationship  with  the  degree  of  voluntary  corporate disclosure 
(Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Ho & Wong, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2002; 
Aktaruddin, 2005; Narasimhan & Vijayalakshmi, 2006; Hossain & Hammami, 2009). 
Negligible research works have been done in the Indian context, to examine the relationship between 
firm characteristics, corporate governance attributes and the degree of corporate disclosure. This 
study examines the association between firm characteristics, corporate governance attributes and the 
level of corporate disclosure.  
The remainder of the research paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the objective of 
the study. Section three presents a review of the literature and develops the study’s hypotheses. The 
research method is outlined in Section four. Section five presents the results. Section six discusses the 
conclusions. Finally, Section seven presents the limitations and directions for future research. 
 
2. Objective of the Study  
 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the association between firm characteristics, 
corporate governance attributes and the extent of corporate disclosure of the 60 listed firms operating 
in India. 
 
3. Review of Literature and Hypothesis Development  
 
3.1 Review of Literature 
 
Demand for corporate disclosure and financial reporting increases day by day due to agency conflicts 
and information asymmetry between managers and outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). In the 
emerging markets, information asymmetry is high due to lower level of transparency (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). By disclosing more information the agency cost of that firm is also expected to be 
reduced. Various factors have been acknowledged by the earlier researchers which play important 
roles in reducing the informational gap between the management and the stakeholders. Firm 
characteristics as well as corporate governance attributes in this respect are considered to be 
important (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Ho & Wong, 2001; Chau & Gray, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Eng & Mak (2003); Aktaruddin, 2005; Narasimhan & Vijayalakshmi, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; 
Aljifri, 2008; Hossain, 2008; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Akhtartuddin et al., 2009; Rouf, 2010). 
Following the views of the abovementioned researchers it may be expected that the decision to 
disclose or not to disclose adequate information is likely to be influenced by a variety of factors like 
board size, family control, CEO duality, firm size, liquidity, leverage, profitability and age of the 
firm. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) have studied the association between corporate governance and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. The results of the study show that the degree of voluntary disclosure is 
positively associated with the board size and the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on the board, while the ratio of the audit committee members on the board is not associated with the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Board size refers to the total number of members exists in the body of Board of Directors. Bigger 
boards are superior for corporate performance because they have more experience people in the board S.Nandi and S. K. Ghosh / Decision Science Letters 2 (2013) 
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that may help for quick and better decisions. Several previous research studies have found a 
significant association between these two variables (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Allegrini & Greco, 
2011). 
Hossain (2008) has found that board composition of a firm may be an important determinant of 
corporate disclosure level. Several previous research studies have found a significant association 
between these two variables (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Akhtartuddin, et al., 2009). Family control is 
an important corporate governance attribute because a large number of firms are owned and 
controlled by the families in the East Asia (Ho & Wong, 2001). In case of family-controlled firms, 
family members usually have important positions both on the team of management and on the board 
of directors. It is expected that, family-controlled firms have inferior corporate governance and lower 
accountability because of ineffective monitoring by the board of directors. CEO duality and ratio of 
audit committee members to total board members, these two corporate governance attributes have 
also been used in some previous research studies (Barako et al., 2006; Ho & Wong, 2001; Rouf, 
2010).  
 
Firm size has persistently been found to be significantly and positively associated with the corporate 
disclosure levels in several studies, suggesting that bigger firms follow better corporate disclosure 
practices (Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989; Ho & Wong, 2001; Akhtaruddin, 2005; 
Narasimhan & Vijayalakshmi, 2006).  
 
Cooke (1989) has argued that a highly profitable firm is more likely to signal to the market its 
superior performance by disclosing more information in its annual report. A significant positive 
relationship has been found in some previous studies (Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace et al., 1994; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) have argued that highly leveraged firm may disclose more information in 
annual reports for reducing the monitoring costs of said firm. A positive relationship has been found 
between leverage and the level of corporate disclosure (Hossain et al, 1994). Liquidity (Wallace et al, 
1994; Wallace & Naser, 1995) and age of the firm (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Aktharuddin, 2005) also 
been used in some previous research studies as firm characters.   In the Indian context, limited 
research works have been conducted by using the above firm characteristics and corporate 
governance attribute as explanatory variables. The present study, therefore, makes a modest attempt 
to fill in this research gap in the Indian context. In order to fulfill this research gap ten hypotheses 
have been formed and tested. Following section is devoted for this purpose. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
For development of the testable hypothesis it is necessary to identify the theoretical and / or a-priori 
relationship between the variables which have been employed in the present study.  
3.2.1 Corporate Governance Attributes 
 
Board Size  
 
Board size is an important corporate governance attribute. Board size has a positive influence on the 
level of corporate voluntary disclosure (Akhtartuddin et al., 2009). Larger boards are better for 
corporate performance because they have a wide range of collective experience and expertise that 
may help for better decisions. A large number of directors on the board can reduce the probability of 
information asymmetry (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). The board size has an effect on the ability of the board 
to monitor and evaluate management (Zahra et al., 2000). Further, the ability of directors to control    48
and  promote  value creating  activities  is  more  likely  to  increase  with  the  increase  of directors 
on the board. Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H1: The degree of corporate disclosure is higher for firms with a big board size. 
 
Board Composition  
 
The purpose of considering board composition is to identify the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board and to assess its impact on the quality of disclosures made through financial reports. The 
quality of corporate disclosure enhances when the proportion of the independent director on the board 
raises (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Haniffa & Cooke (2002) has provided empirical evidence of the 
association between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and the degree of 
voluntary disclosure. Our research study examines the influence of non-executive directors as an 
important component of corporate governance mechanism on the corporate disclosure practices in 
India. It is generally held that higher proportion of non-executive directors reduces information 
asymmetry. Hence, it may be hypothesized that: 
H2: A higher ratio of non-executive directors on a board is positively related to the degree  
          of corporate disclosure. 
 
Ratio of Audit Committee  
 
Effective audit committees are expected to improve the financial reporting quality by fulfilling its 
various responsibilities including, implementing appropriate accounting policies, reviewing the 
accounts including financial statements and reviewing the sufficiency of internal controls. Also audit 
committee plays an important role in appointing and in determining the remuneration of the external 
auditors. It is also empowered to review the auditors work. As a result, audit committee acts as a 
monitoring mechanism and audit committee can help to improve the overall quality of information 
flows between managers and the different interested parties. Audit committee, therefore, may play a 
key role in improving the financial reporting practices which, in turn, is expected to bring down the   
information asymmetry. While most of the earlier studies have sought to examine the influence of 
audit committee on the degree of corporate disclosure, present study proposes to use the size of the 
audit committee as the explanatory variable. A similar research work which has been reported by 
Akhtartuddin et al., (2009) in the Malaysian context, evidences insignificant positive association 
between size of the audit committee and the degree of corporate voluntary disclosure. Present study 
seeks to investigate this issue in the Indian context and accordingly it is hypothesized that:  
 
H3: The level of corporate disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of audit     
        committee members to total members on a board.  
 
Family Control 
 
Firms with wider ownership are likely to disclose more information compared to family-controlled 
firms because the demand for information is high in case of widely held firms (Chau & Gray, 2002). 
Family control is an important corporate governance attribute in India because a large number of 
firms owned and controlled by families (Moody’s-ICRA Corporate Finance, 2007). In case of family-
controlled firms, family members usually occupy important positions both on the team of 
management and on the board of directors. It is, therefore, expected that family-controlled firms have 
inferior corporate governance and lower accountability because of ineffective monitoring by the 
board of directors. Family controlled firm’s performance is lower than that of the firms which are 
controlled by the institutional investors (Piesse et al., 2007). It may, therefore, be hypothesized that: 
H4: Family control is negatively associated to the level of corporate disclosure. S.Nandi and S. K. Ghosh / Decision Science Letters 2 (2013) 
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CEO Duality 
 
CEO duality is an important corporate governance element to every concern in the world. CEO 
duality is said to be present in a concern, when the same person does not perform both the role of 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the board of directors. Unitary leadership structure 
(where the role of CEO and Chairman of the board is performed by the same person) does not support 
the principle of separation of decision management and decision control (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
According to agency theory, the important function of a board can be damaged by the unitary 
leadership structure. CEO may be engaged in some opportunistic behavior with a unitary leadership 
structured firm because of his / her dominance over the board. Duality gives a great understanding 
and knowledge of the firms operating environment that should impact positively on firm 
performance. The following specific hypothesis has been tested regarding CEO duality: 
5 H : The extent of corporate disclosure is higher for firms with a dual leadership structure.  
 
3.2.2 Firm Characteristics 
 
Firm Size  
 
Large firms have higher agency costs than smaller firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 
1981). Moreover, large firms are more visible than smaller firms and, as a result, more exposed to 
public interest (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Due to fear of competition, small firms will disclose less 
information than large firms (Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Most of the previous research studies have 
found significantly positive relationship between the firm size and the level of corporate disclosure 
(Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Narasimhan & 
Vijayalakshmi, 2006; Das et al., 2008).  
 
A plausible explanation of this positive association may be that the larger firms disclose more 
information than the small firms for attracting prospective investors in the capital market. More 
information provided in the financial reports enhances the confidence of the investors (Nagina, 2005) 
and hence, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H6: The degree of corporate disclosures is positively related with the size of the firm.  
 
Profitability  
 
According to signaling theory, profitable firms will disclose more information in the annual report to 
differentiate themselves from poorer performers. Managers  are  motivated  to  disclosure  more  
financial  information  to  support  the  continuance  of their positions and remuneration and to signal 
institutional confidence (Rouf, 2010). Most researchers have found positive relationship between 
profitability and the extent of disclosure (see for example, Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace et al., 
1994; Wallace & Naser, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain, 2008). In this 
research study, profitability has been measured by net profit ratios.  Based on the arguments 
mentioned above present study proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: There is a positive association between profitability and the level of corporate disclosure. 
Leverage 
 
Incidence of high monitoring of the firm by the loan providers takes place in case of a firm which 
uses high level of debt in its capital structure. The cost, associated with the use of debt that may be 
referred to as ‘monitoring cost’ may come down if the degree of corporate disclosure increases 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, for reducing the monitoring costs, firms are expected to disclose   50
more information i.e. the association between the level of corporate disclosure and leverage is likely 
to be positive [Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Aksu & Kosedag, 2005). Financial leverage, may, 
therefore, be expected to influence the extent / degree of voluntary disclosure because a heavily 
leveraged firm has a greater urge to satisfy the demand for information by its long-term creditors 
(Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). Based on this proposition, it is hypothesized that: 
H8: Leverage is positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure. 
 
Liquidity 
 
Liquidity being an important firm characteristic has not widely used as an explanatory variable in the 
previous studies. Firms holding large amount of current assets (high degree of liquidity) has certainly 
employed the costlier long-term funds in current assets instead of using them to earn at a higher rate 
through investments in fixed assets. This may raise doubt among the providers of long-term funds 
about the firms’ efficiency in managing its finance. Under such a situation, a firm may not be a good 
choice among the investing community. In order to relieve the anxiety of the stakeholders including 
that of the investing community or in other words, in order to earn their patronage the firm may feel 
extra motivation to provide adequate information relating to its operational efficiency.  
 
Based on this proposition it is expected that liquidity is positively correlated with the corporate 
disclosure level. Wallace et al. (1994), Wallace & Naser (1995) have used this firm character for 
conducting their research studies. Several financial ratios can be used to evaluate the liquidity 
position of a firm. Those ratios are the current ratio, the quick ratio or acid test ratio and net working 
capital. In a previous study by Ghosh & Nandi (2009) a positive association has been observed 
between the degree of corporate disclosure and liquidity. This earlier finding prompts us to 
hypothesize that: 
                                       
9 H : Liquidity is positively related with the extent of corporate disclosure. 
 
Age of the Firm 
 
The level of a firm’s disclosure may be influenced by its age, i.e. stage of development and growth 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Aktharuddin, 2005). Owusu-Ansah (1998) has pointed out three factors that 
may contribute to this phenomenon. Firstly, younger companies may suffer from competition. 
Secondly, the cost as well as the complexity and hazards of gathering and processing the required 
information may be a contributory factor, and finally, younger companies may lack an attractive track 
record to report. Newer firms may have some problems like lack of capital, brand name and 
reputation compared to the older firms. It is, therefore, expected that, the long-established firms may 
disclose more information or be more compliant than the newly-established firms. The age variable 
has been used in some earlier research studies (Aktharuddin, 2005; Hossain, 2008). But no significant 
association has been reported by both the studies. In the present study, however, a positive 
association is expected in the Indian context and accordingly, following hypothesis is proposed and 
tested: 
10 H   : Long-established firm may disclose more information than newly-established firms. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Sample Selection  
 
The study has been conducted on a sample of 60 arbitrarily selected firms listed on the BSE / NSE 
during the study period from 2000-01 to 2009-10. The research data have been collected from the S.Nandi and S. K. Ghosh / Decision Science Letters 2 (2013) 
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published annual reports which are available in the websites of the respective firms under study.  In 
this study, six industrial sectors have been considered viz. Automobile, Fertilizers, FMCG, 
Information Technology, Pharmaceutical and Steel. 
 
4.2 Preparation of a list of disclosure information  
 
On the issue of measuring the level of corporate disclosure, the Standard & Poor (2008) model has 
been used. Following suggestion of Standard & Poor, 106 disclosure items have been considered for 
this study. As per the said suggestion, these 106 items have been segregated into three broad 
categories, (i) Ownership Structure and Investor Relations (32 items), (ii) Financial Transparency & 
Information Disclosure (37 items) and (iii) Board and Management Structure & Process (37 items).  
 
4.3 Scoring of the disclosure index 
 
For assignment of weights to corporate disclosure items two popular approaches have been used in 
the previous studies. The first approach is the ‘weighted disclosure index’ and the other approach is 
‘un-weighted disclosure index’. Weighted disclosure index gives emphasis on the relative importance 
of disclosure items to the users of the financial reports. Un-weighted disclosure index assumes that 
each item to be equally important.  
 
Researchers such as Courtis (1978), Marston (1986) have used weighted disclosure index. On the 
other hand, Un-weighted disclosure index has been used in few studies (Cooke, 1989, 1991; Hossain 
et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Narasimhan & Vijayalakshmi, 2006; Aljifri, 2008; Akhtartuddin et 
al., 2009). Both weighted disclosure index as well as Un-weighted disclosure index have been used in 
some research studies (Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Mangena & Pike, 2005). In this present 
study, however, an un-weighted disclosure index has been used.  
 
The percentage of actual disclosure with respect to the suggested disclosures by Standard & Poor, has 
been used here to assess the extent of corporate disclosure. For developing firm-specific disclosure 
score the methodology that has been used is: if a firm discloses an item of information included in the 
disclosure list of Standard & Poor, it has been assigned a score of 1, and 0 if it fails to disclose the 
same. Following the guideline of Standard & Poor (2008) maximum corporate disclosure score of a 
firm can be 106. Percentage of actual corporate disclosure has been computed year-wise for every 
company over the 10 year study period. The method used for computing the corporate disclosure 
index for each company can be expressed as follows: 
 
Total un-weighted score obtained by the company 
100
Total score applicable to the company (as per Standard & Poor)
CDI =×  
 
4.4 Dependent and independent variable of the study 
 
The Corporate disclosure index (CDI) has been used as the dependent variable and the independent 
variables are: board size, board composition, ratio of audit committee members to total board 
members, family control, CEO duality, firm size, profitability, leverage, liquidity and age of the firm. 
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are used to provide summarize views of the dependent and independent 
variables. For this purpose, mean, minimum value, maximum value and standard deviation have been 
computed for the entire study period. The observed values are then discussed in the following sub-
section 5.1.    52
4.6 Model development  
The multiple regression model used to test the association between firm characteristics, corporate 
governance attributes and the level of corporate disclosure is presented below: 
 
12 3 4 5 6
78 9 1 0
it it it it it it it
it it it it it
CDI BDSZ BC RAC FC CEOD LTA
PRFT LV LQ AGE
α ββ β β β β
ββ β β ε
=+ + + + + +
++ + ++
 
(1)
where: 
it CDI    = Corporate disclosure index of the i
th company in the t
th year,              
it BDSZ = Board size of the i
th company in the year t, 
it BC      = Ratio of non-executive directors to total members in the board of the ith firm  
                    during year t, 
it RAC    = Proportion of audit committee members to total members in the board of the ith  
                    firm during the year t, 
it FC       = Presence of family control in the board of the i
th company in the year t, 
it CEOD  = Role of chairman and CEO by the same person of the i
th firm in period t,  
it LTA      = Log value of total asset of i
th company in the t
th year,  
it PRFT    = Profitability of the i
th company in the year t,  
it LV       = Leverage of the i
th company in the period t,  
it LQ     = Liquidity of the i
th company in the year,  
  it AGE    = Age of the i
th company in the period t, 
α             = the constant, 
β           = the slope of the regression equation, and 
it ε           = the error term.  
 
4.7 Multicollinearity Test 
The study is concerned with the individual effect of the explanatory variables on the level of 
corporate disclosure. As these values, in a large part, represent the accounting numbers generated by 
firm, interrelationships among them are expected. Hence, the presence of multicollinearity is required 
to be tested and, if necessary, should be converted in order to specify an appropriate model that can 
be efficiently used for the present purpose. Earlier research studies have used the techniques like 
simple correlation and VIF for examining the presence of multicollinearity (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009 
and Hossain & Hammami, 2009). In the present study, in addition to simple correlation and VIF, the 
presence of multicollinearity has tested by using the tolerance value following the suggestion of 
Gujrati (2004). The results of the multicollinearity are discussed in the sub-section 5.2. 
4.8 Multiple regression analysis  
As mentioned earlier in sub-section 4.6, the regression analysis has been used to assess the 
association between corporate disclosure level (dependent variable) and several independent variables 
(board size, board composition, ratio of audit committee members to total board members, family 
control, CEO duality, firm size, profitability, leverage, liquidity and age of the firm).  In sub-section 
5.3 the results of the multiple regression analysis have been discussed. 
 
 S.Nandi and S. K. Ghosh / Decision Science Letters 2 (2013) 
 
53
5. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
As mentioned in earlier, descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and independent variables 
are reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1   
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables   
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean   Std. Deviation
Corporate Disclosure Index (CDI) 35.85   75.47 62.4205 4.79377  
Board Size (BDSZ) 4.00 27.00 10.3400 3.73528  
Board Composition (BC) 0.32 0.89 0.6803 0.26869  
Ratio of Aud. Comm. Members (RAC) 0.00 0.78 0.4242 0.13526  
Family Control (FC) 0.00 1.00 0.4520 0.49819  
CEO Duality (CEOD) 0.00 1.00 0.6200 0.48587  
Log Value of Total Assets (LTA) 0.24 4.56 2.8567 0.79681  
Profitability (PRFT) -15.38 124.97 11.8485 10.98509  
Leverage (LV) 0.00 6.50 0.3494 0.66706  
Liquidity (LQ) 0.35 5.40 2.9632 3.64522  
Age of the firm (AGE) 3.00   164.00   33.6500   32.62754  
 
 
The results from the corporate disclosure index (CDI) indicate that the minimum score achieved by a 
firm is 35.85 and the maximum score is 75.47 with a standard deviation of 4.794 percent. It is also 
found that the selected Indian firms, on average, disclose 62.42 percent of the items of information to 
be disclosed as per Standard & Poor (2008) specification. Compared to the levels of disclosures as 
observed by Patel et al., (2002) at 39% the present study evidences that considerable improvement 
has been taken place during the study period. 
 
The mean value of the board (BDSZ) size is 10.34 with minimum and maximum sizes are 4 and 27 
respectively. The mean of the proportion of the non-executive directors (BC) to the total board 
members on the board is 68.03 percent, which shows that a large number of directors are non-
executive directors. The mean value of ratio of audit committee members (RAC) show that on an 
average the substantial portion of the total board members has been chosen from the audit committee 
members (42.42%) by the firms in India.  The mean value of family (FC) control is 45.20 percent 
which denotes that in India, a significant portion of firms are controlled by the family. The average 
value of CEO duality (CEOD) is 0.62. This indicates that on an average 62% of the Indian firms have 
engaged two different persons as chairman and CEO (i.e. CEO duality) in order to manage the affairs 
of the business. 
 
The minimum value of firm size (LTA) is 0.24 and the maximum value is 4.56. This firm size value 
denotes that the firms are expansively dispersed. The statistics on the profitability (PRFT) reveal that 
profitability varies between -15.38% (negative profit) and 124.97% (maximum profit) which, in turn, 
focuses on the wide variability (SD= 10.985) in the profit generating ability of the selected firms. 
However, the average profitability value is found to be moderate (mean= 11.849) which speaks for 
the moderate efficiency level of selected Indian firms. The mean value of leverage (LV) ratio is 34.94 
percent which indicates that long-term debt occupies a significant portion in the capital structure. In 
this study, the selected firms have followed a conservative approach. The mean value of liquidity 
(LQ) ratio is 2.96, indicates that the short-term loan payment capacity of the selected firms are very 
high. Firm age (AGE) ranges from 3 to 164 with a mean of 33.65 for the full sample.  
5.2. Multicollinearity Analysis   54
As mentioned in the previous sub-section 4.7, the multicollinearity in the explanatory variables have 
been diagnosed through the analysis of correlation factors and Variable Inflation Factors (VIF).  
Table  2   
Pearson Correlation Analysis Results   
Variable  CDI  BDSZ  BC  RAC  FC  CEOD  LTA  PRFT  LV  LQ  AGE  
CDI    1.000                      
BDSZ  0.242**  1.000              
BC   0.068   -0.123**   1.000                  
RAC  0.146**  0.659**  0.179**  1.000               
FC   0.080   -0.259**   0.019   0.082   1.000              
CEOD  0.063  0.146**  0.033  -0.045  0.001  1.000           
LTA   0.550**   0.646**   0.042   0.499**   -0.222**   0.215**   1.000          
PRFT  0.102*  0.024  -0.001  -0.078  -0.134**  -0.049  0.053  1.000       
LV   -0.009   0.141**   -0.052   -0.033   0.163**   0.064   0.089*   -0.141**   1.000      
LQ  0.116**  -0.205**  -0.079  0.141**  -0.057  -0.217**  0.296**  0.163**  -0.072  1.000   
AGE   0.140**   0.201**   -0.025   -0.148**   -0.059   0.268**   0.404**   -0.062   -0.033   -0.181**   1.000  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The Pearson correlation analysis reported in Table 2, reveals that the highest simple correlation 
between independent variables is 0.659 between board size and ratio of audit committee members to 
total board members. According to Gujrati (2004) and Hair et al. (2011) the simple correlation not 
exceeding 0.90 between the independent variables should not be considered harmful. The VIF values 
higher than 10 are likely to cause a multicollinearity problem (Gaur & Gaur, 2009). As the VIF 
values range between 2.621 and 1.116 (i.e., for less than 10), it may be argued that collinearity is not 
a problem for this regression model. The tolerance is another measure of multicollinearity. As 
suggested by Hair et al. (2011), the tolerance value more than 0.20 may be used as a criterion for 
considering the data being free from the problem of multicollinearity. The calculated tolerance values 
vary between 0.381 and 0.896, and hence, indicate that there is no collinearity between the 
independent variables.  
5.3. Discussion of regression result 
 
As mentioned in proceeding section 4.8, the study has used a multiple regression model to study the 
influence of firm-specific factors on the levels of corporate disclosure variables. The results of 
pertaining to the regression model are presented in Table 3. The R-square values vary between 0.446 
and 0.526. The observed R-square values indicate that the explanatory power of the selected 
independent variables together varies between 44.6% and 52.6% (minimum of 44.6% and maximum 
of 52.6%).  
 
Table 3   
Regression Result of Corporate Disclosure Index, Firm Characteristics and Corporate Governance 
Attributes (Year-wise) 
Year  Constant  BDSZ  BC RAC  FC CEOD LTA PRFT LV LQ AGE  R
2  F-Stat
2000-01   48.201**  
(6.169)  
0.134  
(0.335)  
-1.559  
(-0.303)  
4.571  
(0.516)  
3.414*  
(2.323)  
-0.021  
(-0.014)  
3.611**  
(3.176)  
0.100*  
(2.520)  
-0.405  
(-0.316)  
0.044  
(0.464)  
-0.031  
(-1.279)  
0.451   2.839**  
2001-02  39.719**  
(5.778)  
0.388  
(1.184)  
-3.835  
(-0.763)  
16.513*  
(2.028)  
4.567*  
(3.430)  
0.595  
(0.435)  
3.896**  
(3.106)  
0.163*  
(2.474)  
-0.813  
(-1.042)  
0.114  
(0.637)  
-0.016  
(-0.702)  
0.526  3.830**  
2002-03    45.272**  
(7.796)  
0.186  
(0.601)  
0.316  
(0.064)  
7.518  
(1.333)  
3.242*  
(2.802)  
0.457  
(0.362)  
4.033**  
(3.734)  
0.014  
(0.309)  
-0.870  
(-1.232)  
0.138  
(0.809)  
-0.023  
(1.169)  
0.470   3.068**  
2003-04    46.775**  
(7.364)  
-0.016  
(-0.052)  
-2.457  
(-0.466)  
9.470  
(1.628)  
3.719*  
(3.070)  
0.304  
(0.239)  
4.407**  
(3.970)  
0.063  
(1.011)  
-0.568  
(-0.674)  
0.061  
(0.356)  
-0.030  
(-1.544)  
0.499  3.439**  
2004-05   50.707**  
(9.556)  
0.212  
(0.840)  
-2.918  
(-0.621)  
4.984  
(1.020)  
2.667*  
(2.262)  
0.233  
(0.219)  
4.675**  
(4.985)  
0.079  
(1.326)  
-0.279  
(-0.215)  
0.135  
(0.624)  
-0.024  
(-1.379)  
0.524   3.799**  
2005-06  49.607**  
(9.173)  
0.076  
(0.324)  
-3.563  
(-0.748)  
5.977  
(1.123)  
2.559*  
(2.296)  
-0.052  
(-0.047)  
4.653**  
(4.794)  
0.055  
(0.682)  
-0.126  
(-0.116)  
0.139  
(0.507)  
-0.026  
(-1.436)  
0.513  3.636**  
2006-07   50.588**  
(8.846)  
0.109  
(0.605)  
-3.188  
(-0.600)  
5.340  
(0.965)  
1.823  
(1.674)  
0.142  
(0.130)  
4.615**  
(4.613)  
0.119  
(1.454)  
-0.031  
(-0.031)  
0.089  
(0.361)  
-0.020  
(-1.171)  
0.516   3.677**  
2007-08  50.344**  
(7.523)  
0.019  
(0.102)  
0.196  
(0.038)  
2.943  
(0.516)  
0.919  
(0.815)  
0.541  
(0.461)  
4.312**  
(3.774)  
-0.007  
(-0.113)  
0.222  
(0.236)  
-0.007  
(-0.021)  
-0.020  
(-1.152)  
0.446  2.776**  
2008-09   52.986**  
(6.339)  
0.071  
(0.395)  
-2.670  
(-0.562)  
3.317  
(0.584)  
0.708  
(0.640)  
0.560  
(0.516)  
4.431**  
(4.450)  
0.026  
(0.465)  
-0.064  
(-0.073)  
0.107  
(0.342)  
-0.023  
(-1.371)  
0.468   3.039**  
2009-10  48.483**  
(5.520)  
0.046  
(0.264)  
0.982  
(1.492)   
3.206  
(0.571)  
0.780  
(0.744)  
0.564  
(0.526)  
4.822**  
(4.940)  
0.017  
(0.275)  
0.143  
(0.166)  
0.266  
(0.871)  
-0.016  
(-1.032)  
0.526  3.827**  
**Regression is significant at 1% level                          
*Regression is significant at 10% level S.Nandi and S. K. Ghosh / Decision Science Letters 2 (2013) 
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This means that the selected independent variables together moderately explain the variances of 
corporate disclosure level. Some of the earlier research studies, however, have reported better 
explanatory power using different sets of independent variables [Hossain (2008) at 53.80 percent, 
Akhtaruddin (2005) at 57.70 percent and Haniffa & Cooke (2002) at 58.30 percent].  Conventionally, 
F statistic with a p value less than 0.01 is used as a measure of goodness of fit the model used to 
examine the impact of a set of independent variable. The observed F values are higher than the table 
value at p=0.10 level   which speak in favour of the appropriation of the regression model employed 
in the present study. Hence, based on the values of R-square and F-statistic it may be argued that the 
multiple regression model used in this study has a good explanatory power. 
 
Corporate disclosure score and board size (BDSZ) is found to be positively related in all the years 
except in the year 2003-04. These multiple regression results support the argument that the larger 
boards provide more corporate information than the smaller firms. The positive effect of board size 
on the level of corporate disclosure is consistent with Akhtaruddin et al., (2009) and Allegrini & 
Greco (2011). A negative relationship is observed between the board composition (BC) and the 
corporate disclosure level in all the years except in the years 2002-03, 2007-08 and 2009-10. The 
results suggest that firms with a higher proportion of non-executive directors disclose less corporate 
information. Empirical evidences (excluding of the three years mentioned earlier) of the study are 
consistent with those reported by Ho & Wong (2001) and Barako et al. (2006) in respect of the 
association between the board composition and the extent of corporate disclosure.  
 
Corporate disclosure level and audit committee size (RAC) is found to be positively associated in all 
the years though not statistically significant excepting in the year 2001-02. This indicates that the 
higher proportion of audit committee members on the board may have positive impact on the level of 
corporate disclosure. Relating to family control (FC), the result of the study indicates that family 
control is positively related with the degree of corporate disclosure. Thus, the hypothesis 4 is not 
found to be supported by the empirical evidences of the present study. However, in respect of the 
association between the level of corporate disclosure and the CEO duality (CEOD), the observed 
empirical findings support the a-priori relationship in all the years except in the years 2000-01 and 
2005-06.  
 
The present study identifies the firm size (LTA) as the most significant firm characteristic variable 
influencing the corporate disclosure practices in India. The hypothesis that ‘the big firms disclose 
more information than the small firms’ is supported (p < .01). The finding is consistent with those of 
the prior studies (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace & Naser, 
1995; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In case of profitability (PRFT), however, a 
mixed result is found. This independent variable is such to be positively associated with the level of 
corporate disclosure in all the years except in the year 2007-08. This observed positive effect of 
profitability on the degree of corporate disclosure is consistent with Wallace et al. (1994), Karim 
(1996), Owusu-Ansah (1998), and Hossain (2000). These results suggest that managers of profitable 
firms will disclose more accounting information in the annual reports to justify their salaries (Singhvi 
& Desai, 1971). Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that profitable firms provide more information in 
the financial reports than do the less or negative profitable firms. In contrast with the hypothesized 
relationship, leverage (LV) and the level of corporate disclosure is found to be negatively associated 
in all the years except in the years 2007-08 and 2009-10. The negative effect of the leverage on the 
extent of corporate disclosure is consistent with the empirical findings of the study conducted by 
Allegrini & Greco (2011). As regards the relationship between corporate disclosure level and 
liquidity (LQ), a positive association is observed in all the years except in the year 2007-08. Thus, the 
hypothesized association is found to be supported by and large by the empirical evidences of the 
present research study.  Relating to the age of the firm (AGE), the result of the study does not 
advocate the hypothesized relationship. This empirical evidence is consistent with that reported by   56
Akhtaruddin, (2005). However, Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Hossain (2008) have found a positive 
association between the said variables. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the association between firm characteristics, corporate governance attributes 
and the level of corporate disclosure of 60 listed firms in India during the study period ranging 
between 2000-01 and 2009-10. The study indicates that the corporate disclosure level of the selected 
listed firms in India depends on some corporate governance attributes and firm characteristics.  
Regarding the association between corporate governance attributes and the extent of corporate 
disclosure, a positive association is found between board size, ratio of audit committee members to 
total board members, family control, CEO duality and the degree of corporate disclosure. However, 
board composition is negatively related to the level of corporate disclosure. While in case of most of 
the selected variables the hypothesized associations are found to have been supported by the 
empirical findings, in case of family control and board composition contrary observations have been 
obtained. Hence, reasons for such inconsistencies are required to be further investigated. 
 
About the relationship between firm characteristics and corporate disclosure score, a negative 
association is observed between leverage, age of the firm and the extent of corporate disclosure. 
However, the firm size, profitability and liquidity are seen to have positively influenced the degree of 
corporate disclosure. In so far as the hypothesized associations of the level of corporate disclosure 
and firm-specific variables are concerned, the empirical findings appear to be different in case of 
leverage and age of the firm. Positive influence in both the cases is normally expected. Hence, the 
reasons behind these contrary findings need to be further investigated. A plausible explanation of the 
reported unusual association in case of leverage may be that for closely held firms (whose free-float 
shares are comparatively less) it is possible to keep the disclosure level low. Particularly in the 
context of a less vibrant debt market, firms generally try to tap the institutional investors segment (in 
many cases banks and non-banking financial institutions) for the purpose of raising debt funds. Under 
such a situation, provides of debt funds may not urge upon the firms for a higher level of public 
disclosure; rather they may put emphasis on the submission of the required information by the firms 
which are necessary for assessing the privately placed debt instruments. Hence, for a closely held 
levered firm, a negative association between level of corporate disclosure and leverage is possible. 
Similarly, for a closely held age old firm, a positive association between degree of corporate 
disclosure and age of the firm may not observed.   
 
7. Limitations and future research direction 
 
In spite of a sincere effort to accomplish the stated objective, the present research study is not free 
from limitations. The first and foremost concern in this respect in the sample size which act as the 
constraint for generalizing the observed findings in the Indian context. For ensuring generalization, 
one needs to reinvestigate the identified issue using a fairly large data set for a sufficiently long 
period of time. The data set should also cover all the sectors of Indian industries. Measurement of 
variables also needs to be reviewed and alternative appropriate techniques may also be used. Also, 
attention should be paid to use some improved methodology which may be helpful in specifying an 
appropriate model for the stated purpose. Some other important variables namely audit firm size, 
asset-in-place and firm value which have used by a few earlier studies may also be included in the 
model to find out the degree of various determinants of corporate disclosures.  
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